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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael William Tappin appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 
heroin, entered upon his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he argues that the district 
court erred by denying his suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On January 11, 2012, Detective Andreoli, an undercover narcotics officer, 
arranged to purchase heroin from Steven McDaniel. (Tr., p.14, L.5 - p.15, L.8.) 
McDaniel and a friend, Mikey, were traveling to Seattle to purchase more heroin, after 
which McDaniel would be able to sell 10 grams of high quality heroin to Detective 
Andreoli. (Tr., p.15, L.9- p.16, L.3; p.85, Ls.6-15.) McDaniel kept in contact with 
Detective Andreoli by phone and text, and they ultimately scheduled the delivery for 
January 14. (Tr., p.16, L.4-p.19, L.10.) 
On the morning of January 14, Detective Andreoli, with a surveillance team 
standing by, drove to the Shell Station on Federal Way where he met with McDaniel for 
the heroin delivery. (Tr., p.21, L.16 - p.23, L.11.) McDaniel informed Detective 
Andreoli that he could not complete the sale because his friend, Mikey, had his digital 
scale. (Tr., p.23, L.19 - p.24, L.13.) After attempting, and failing, to purchase a 
replacement scale at Fred Meyer, McDaniel determined that they would drive to Mikey's 
house and get his scale back. (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.27, L.5.) As they approached the 
house, McDaniel had Detective Andreoli stop the car and got out to walk the rest of the 
way. (Tr., p.28, Ls.2-10.) According to McDaniel, Mikey did not like people knowing 
where he lived. (Id.) 
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Detective Andreoli observed McDaniel walk north on Virginia Street and radioed 
the information to the surveillance team. (Tr., p.28, Ls.11-21.) The surveillance team 
had been provided with a photograph of McDaniel. (Tr., p.58, Ls.1-6.) To avoid being 
spotted by McDaniel or driving past him, they drove around an adjacent street, Annette 
Street, and identified McDaniel as he returned from one of two houses on West Virginia 
Street. (Tr., p.63, L.10 - p.65, L.12.) McDaniel, returning to Detective Andreoli's car, 
then directed him back to the Shell Station where he produced a digital scale and 
completed the drug transaction. (Tr., p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.11.) McDaniel left Detective 
Andreoli and was shortly thereafter apprehended by Detective Bruner. (Tr., p.68, L.19 -
p.69, L.6.) 
Meanwhile, roughly a quarter of a mile away, surveillance officers observed the 
two houses on West Virginia Street. (Tr., p.69, L.24 - p.70, L.2; p.121, L.25 - p.123, 
L.12.) A car, with its driver on the phone, pulled up and parked, made a sudden u-turn 
and parked, and then pulled forward and parked again, all without signaling. (Tr., p.71, 
L.8 - p.73, L.7.) A man exited one of the houses on West Virginia Street and got into 
the passenger side of the car. (Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.23.) As the car began to pull 
away from the curb, officers enforced a traffic stop. (Tr., p.77, Ls.1-20.) Immediately 
after the stop, officers observed the passenger lean forward and reach his hands 
towards his waistband or pocket area. (Tr., p.77, L.21 - p.78, L.8.) Officers contacted 
the passenger, who gave his name as Mike Tappin. (Tr., p.78, L.9 - p.79, L.10.) A 
uniformed officer asked Tappin if he had any weapons or contraband and for permission 
to search Tappin's person. (Tr., p.79, Ls.15-25.) Tappin granted consent. (Tr., p.80, 
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Ls.1-2.) During that search, officers found heroin in Tappin's right front pants pocket. 
(Tr., p.82, Ls.11-22.) 
A grand jury indicted Tappin with conspiracy to traffic in heroin, trafficking in 
heroin, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.30-32.) Tappin filed a motion to 
suppress on the ground that there was no legal basis for the detention. (R., pp.56-64.) 
After a hearing on the motion (Tr., pp.7-137), the district court denied the suppression 
motion (R., pp.75-78). 
Tappin entered into a conditional plea agreement, pursuant to which the state 
dismissed the conspiracy and paraphernalia charges and Tappin pleaded guilty to the 
trafficking charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 
(R., pp.79-86; see also Tr., p.138, Ls.7-20.) The district court entered judgment against 
Tappin and sentenced him to 15 years with 10 years fixed on his conviction of trafficking 
in heroin. (R., pp.89-90.) Tappin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.94-97.) 
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ISSUE 
Tappin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tappin's motion to 
suppress, because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity, and thus 
his consent to a search was ineffective? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Tappin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion To 
Suppress 
A Introduction 
During a narcotics investigation, surveillance officers enforced a traffic stop on a 
suspicious vehicle for making an illegal u-turn and failing to signal. (R., pp.76-77; see 
also Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.72, L.12; p.77, Ls.1-20.) Tappin, a passenger in the vehicle, 
consented to a search of his person by officers, which led to the discovery of heroin. 
(R., p.78; see also Tr., p.79, L.19 - p.80, L.2.) Subsequently, Tappin filed a 
suppression motion (R., pp.56-64), which was denied by the district court (R., pp.75-78). 
On appeal, Tappin asserts that the district court erred by denying his suppression 
motion because, he argues, his consent was invalid due to the traffic stop being 
unreasonably extended. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) This argument fails on two 
independent bases: First, it was not the argument Tappin raised to the district court in 
support of suppression, and Tappin is precluded from raising it for the first time on 
appeal; second, application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the 
district court shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
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(Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Tappin's Suppression Motion 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more 
similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific 
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 
about to be engaged 1n criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
Generally, warrantless searches are considered unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done 
pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. 
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Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). Freely and voluntarily given consent 
validates a search. Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted). The voluntariness 
of an individual's consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality 
of the circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamante, 412 
U.S. at 248-49). 
In this case, noting that the vehicle's driver committed several traffic infractions, 
the district court held that the traffic stop was justified based on the totality of the 
circumstances. (R., p.78.) The district court further held that once the stop occurred, 
nothing precluded the officer from asking Tappin if he would consent to a search. (Id.) 
Finally, the court noted that Tappin did not challenge the fact that he voluntarily 
consented to the search of his person. (Id.) Therefore, the search and seizure of 
Tappin was valid and the district court denied Tappin's suppression motion. (Id.) 
On appeal, Tappin concedes that the traffic stop was valid at its inception and 
does not challenge the court's holding that he consented to the search. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-7.) Instead, Tappin argues that his consent was ineffective because, he 
contends, his detention was unlawfully extended. (Id., pp.6-13.) This argument was not 
raised to the district court and so may not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). This is especially true 
in relation to suppression motions where the defendant has the burden to present 
grounds for his motion to the trial court and may not raise alternative grounds for 
suppression for the first time on appeal. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161-162, 15 
P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (2000); see also I.C.R. 47. Because Tappin failed to raise this 
argument below, the state did not have the direct opportunity to respond with evidence 
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or argument to challenge it, and the district court did not have the opportunity to 
consider it. Tappin is therefore precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court considers Tappin's new argument, he has still failed to show 
that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion. Tappin's contention that 
the traffic stop was unlawfully extended is premised on officers asking Tappin at the 
inception of the traffic stop whether he had any weapons or contraband, if he would 
consent to a search of his person, and where he lived. (Id., pp.8-10.) Tappin asserts 
that these questions were unnecessary to address the traffic violation and therefore 
represent an unlawful extension of the traffic stop. (Id.) Application of the correct legal 
standards, however, shows that the detention was not unlawfully extended. 
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must 
also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 
2004). "There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer 
than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the law 
enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008). Most importantly, 
"[b]rief, general questions about drugs and weapons, in and of themselves, do not 
extend an otherwise lawful detention." kl at 496, 198 P.3d at 134. Thus, the officer's 
briefly asking Tappin, the passenger of the car, if he had drugs or weapons, and 
requesting consent to search Tappin's person for the same, did not unlawfully extend 
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the duration of the stop to investigate the driver of the car. Tappin's consent to the 
search was therefore valid. 
Even if officers needed reasonable suspicion of a drug crime in order to ask brief 
questions regarding drugs and weapons and request consent to search Tappin's person 
for the same, the officers possessed the required reasonable suspicion. Reasonable 
suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that 
naturally follow from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 
894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991). While the quantity and quality of 
information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to 
establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), reasonable 
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion," United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The reasonableness of an 
officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances. Cortez, 
449 U.S. at 417-18; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). 
This case arose from a related controlled purchase of heroin from Steven 
McDaniel. (R., pp.75-76.) McDaniel was not working alone. (Tr., p.32, L.15 - p.34, 
L.6; p.85, Ls.6-15.) Officers knew that within a couple days of selling the heroin, 
McDaniel had purchased it in Seattle with his friend. (Tr., p.16, L.10 - p.17, L.3.) The 
friend, Mikey, had McDaniel's digital scale, and McDaniel went to Mikey's house to pick 
it up. (Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.28, L.10.) Officers knew that McDaniel had gone to one of two 
houses on West Virginia Street to pick up the scale from Mikey. (Tr., p.64, L.24 - p.65, 
L.12.) After arresting McDaniel, officers placed the two houses under observation. (Tr., 
p.69, L.24-p.70, L.2; p.121, L.25-p.123, L.12.) 
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One of the detectives observing the houses was Detective Bruner. (Tr., p.69, 
L.24 - p.70, L.2.) Detective Bruner had substantial training and experience working in 
narcotics interdiction. (Tr., p.52, L.16-p.54, L.7.) Detective Bruner observed a vehicle 
with its driver on the phone park, make a u-turn, park again, drive a little further and 
park again, all of which his experience indicated was consistent with a drug transaction 
about to occur. (Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.73, L.7.) Tappin exited one of the two houses under 
observation and got into the vehicle. (Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.23.) While officers 
enforced a traffic stop, Detective Bruner observed Tappin lean forward in his seat and 
place his hands in his waistband or pocket area. (Tr., p.77, L.1 - p.78, L.8.) Officers 
contacted Tappin and asked his name, which he gave as Mike Tappin, a name 
consistent with Mikey. (Tr., p.79, Ls.3-14.) Under the totality of these circumstances, 
officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to ask if Tappin possessed any weapons or 
drugs, and to request consent to search for the same. 
Applying the correct legal standards to the facts before it, the district court 
correctly denied Tappin's suppression motion. Tappin has failed to show error in the 
district court's denial of his motion. The district court's order denying the suppression 
motion should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Tappin's suppression motion. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of May, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
BEN PATRICK McGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
\~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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